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Both incidents made waves in Italo-German relations.
But in 1984, the Germans said: How could just you say that?
You, as being our allies and friends?
Nowadays, in contrast, you clearly feel the German contempt:
How dare that guy down there in Italy say such a thing?
Luigi Vittorio Ferraris1
1 Introduction
For quite a long time, Italo-German relations have been treated like a red-headed 
stepchild.2 Neither do they matter in research on foreign policy, nor in domestic 
politics within both countries. Relationships to the US, France and to direct 
neighbours are considered as to be more important. It has been mainly through 
public quarrels, for example in recent times about German refusal against 
Italian participation in the 5+1-talks with Iran3, that their bilateral relationship 
attracted interest. Despite widespread indifference, however, among observers 
of Italo-German relations an inspiring debate on the relationship’s actual status 
has broken out. The discussions culminated in a publication conjointly edited 
by three approved experts in the field (Rusconi/Schlemmer/Woller 2008). The 
book presents a wide spectrum of perspectives on the question of continuity 
versus change. Positions range from decidedly supporting the hypothesis of 
both countries’ estrangement up to clearly affirming the exact opposite, namely 
emphasising the very stability of the relationship. Rusconi, most prominently, 
argues that since the fall of the Berlin Wall, German-Italian relations are 
undergoing a process of significant changes, towards what he calls “gradual 
estrangement”. Because important “axioms” of the bilateral relationship have 
1  During an interview with the authoress in Rome, June 2005.
2  This working paper presents first results of a research stay at the Istituto Affari Internazionali 
(Rome) in the autumn 2008. The Institute provided an inspiring and helpful research environment. 
A grant from the German Academic Exchange Service provided the necessary financial support. 
Former versions of this paper have been presented to doctoral colloquiums at the University of 
Trier and at the University of Bremen. I would like to thank all participants, and particularly 
Rainer Baumann, Bernhard Zangl and Hanns W. Maull, for their useful suggestions and advice. I 
also thank Alexander Grasse and the anonymous referee for their comments.
3  The 5+1 group negotiates nuclear issues with Teheran. It consists of the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council − China, Russian, France, Britain, and the US − plus Germany. In June 
2007, Germany openly took position against Italy’s participation in the group, which caused strong 
protest in Rome.
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lost their centrality, each country’s foreign policy is no longer as convergent as 
before and politicians from both sides find it difficult to understand each other. 
Consequently, political cooperation becomes inefficient or does no longer take 
place at all (Rusconi 2008). In the same volume, this claim is contradicted 
by Woller who argues that cultural, economic and social relations between 
both countries are more intense than ever before, not at least due to political 
promotion. Italo-German relations remain to be about a “special relationship”. 
In that sense, he describes their actual status not as estrangement but as 
“normality with empathy” (Woller 2008: 17). Due to the well-informed and 
empirically rich contributions, the volume delivers illuminating insights into 
the reality of Italo-German relations. Nevertheless, the reader is left clueless 
in view of weighing up the different arguments. That is why the question of 
continuity versus change is still open.
The present study aims to contribute to this debate and take it one step 
further. I will compare two empirical cases of bilateral conflict. These have 
taken place at different points in time, that is to say before and after the end 
of the cold war: in 1984, when Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti called the 
desirability of German reunification into question, and in 2003, when Prime 
Minister Berlusconi accused a German European deputy of behaving like a 
Nazi guard. I will examine systematically whether patterns of change will 
prevail over continuity, and whether we can speak, in these concrete cases, 
about estrangement or not. Furthermore, I want to put forward a systematic 
analysis of changes in bilateral relations. Building on insights of social 
constructivism, I propose a two-layer analysis examining interaction and – 
over and above – patterns of meaning. Such an approach does not only allow 
assessing the existence of potential changes but also accounts for their depth. 
The study’s empirical basis is firstly a content analysis of newspaper coverage, 
including four German and four Italian newspapers. Secondly, problem-
centred qualitative interviews have been conducted with involved German 
and Italian diplomats. Results do underline the existence of what Rusconi 
called estrangement, and they illustrate an ongoing change within the bilateral 
relationship of Italy and Germany.
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2 Analytical Framework: Change in Bilateral Relations
Delving deeper into research on bilateral relations, it soon becomes apparent 
that blurriness in terms of concepts, criticized above in the case of Rusconi/
Schlemmer/Woller (2008), is not an isolated case. Quite the contrary, their 
volume represents nothing but the most recent example of lacking theoretical 
frameworks when studying bilateral relationships systematically. Nowadays 
it seems almost antiquated to study bilateral relations of nation-states while 
the rest of the IR community debates globalisation, denationalization, supra-
nationalism and non-state actors. However, there is no sign at all that bilateral 
contacts have been replaced – though its characteristic features, settings and 
proceedings may have changed (Hellmann et al. 2007). States are, and remain 
to be, committed to the dialogue with other states. It is striking, therefore, that 
there is no specific bilateral relations literature in IR4. Prevalently, bilateral 
relations are treated within the framework of diplomacy studies, concerned 
indeed with relations between states. Yet, in most cases these studies are 
insufficient to address important aspects of bilateral relationships. As a field 
mainly consisting of narratives of retired practitioners, they are of limited 
conceptual wealth and of a rather descriptive character (Sofer 1988; Hocking 
2005). Focusing almost exclusively on “important men”, they cannot account 
for change other than merely behavioural adaptation. In order to study 
changes in their different degrees, it is necessary to include an analysis of 
social structures in which concrete interactions are rooted. Hence, an injection 
of social constructivist insights will improve our understanding of bilateral 
relations significantly.
As social constructivists have pointed out, an understanding of intersubjective 
structures is important to comprehend what states do. First attempts to transfer 
constructivist approaches to the realm of diplomacy are promising (Jönsson 
2002; Sharp 1999; Neumann 2002; Lose 2001; Krotz 2007). Diplomacy itself is 
not conceptualized as a “natural product” of somehow given national interests, 
but viewed as constructed in processes of communication and interaction5. 
4  Many encyclopaedias, such as the Encyclopaedia of International Relations and Global Politics 
and the Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics, do not even hold entries on the term. All the 
more interesting seems to be a project by Krotz and Katzenstein, who are currently working on a 
research project “Bilateralism between Unilateralism and Multilateralism: Germany and the United 
States in Europe and the North Atlantic World”. This project seeks to deepen our understanding of 
bilateralism in world politics – its nature and variety, and its conflicts and compatibilities within 
different multilateral and unilateral contexts.
5  This claim does not imply that instrumental rationality plays no role within bilateral relations. 
However, what is conceived as “national interest” depends on broader, constructed structures of 
meaning.
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Analyses of diplomatic relations need no longer be purely descriptive, but 
offer a theoretical framework of reference; they are not concerned merely with 
single decisions, but able to explain long-range developments in foreign policy; 
and the actor-focus is complemented with a conception of social structures 
in which action is embedded. Applied to the concrete case of a bilateral 
relationship, a two-dimensional model evolves. Firstly, and most concretely, 
interaction has to be studied. Be it formal or informal consultations, exchanges 
of information, institutional bindings or common initiatives in wider contexts 
– interactions are understood as a continuous and complex process linking 
together both partners (Saunders 1993)6. Interaction obviously is the most 
visible and tangible layer of a bilateral relationship. However, there is more 
to it than that. As Saunders (1993: 13) puts it aptly, “We begin to understand 
the relationship only when we understand ways in which each may perceive 
itself in contrast to another”. Therefore, the analysis of meaning has to be 
integrated as second dimension. It consists of constructions both partners 
attach to the relationship, how they perceive their own role, their partner 
and their togetherness. These constructions establish some kind of ideational 
framework in which concrete interaction takes place. They thus limit free, 
individual choices of action: bilateral interaction does not evolve in a vacuum. 
Including a dimension of meaning allows accounting for deeper changes, since 
alterations in intersubjective meanings is less likely than on the behavioural 
level. Conversely, if changes can be found also in the dimension of meaning, 
change will be substantive and profound.
Applying these considerations to empirical cases, I rely on the assumption 
that changes in interaction patterns and social structures can be best observed 
in situations of conflict. Here, all of a sudden everyday business and meanings 
of the relationship become called into question. Situations of conflict do 
not necessarily lead to uncooperative behaviour, but offer a wide range of 
interaction opportunities: Partners can treat each other in a more confrontational 
or more integrative way (Pfetsch 2006), demonstrating higher or lower partner 
orientation (Pfeiffer 2006), fostering therewith conflict solution or escalation. 
What differs is not the sheer existence of conflicts but in fact the way of 
dealing with them. Therefore, I will compare interaction patterns in terms of 
solution- versus escalation-promoting behaviour. In this sense, dense contacts 
and willingness to compromise would indicate a solution-oriented strategy, 
6  As the focus lies on the political-diplomatic bilateral relationship, this means interaction 
between governments.
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whereas insistence or even the total absence of settlement efforts would reflect 
an escalating behaviour. I treat potential changes in this dimension as indicator 
for wider changes in bilateral interaction.
In addition, conflicts offer interesting insights into social constructions. They 
tend to challenge traditional perceptions and may even lead to new ones, which 
is why meanings are most probably mentioned clearly and discussed openly. 
Hence, conflicts are some kind of focal points to study the constructions of 
meanings attached to a relationship. For grasping potential changes, I suggest 
focusing on a scale from value orientation to pragmatism: When asking for 
reasons, motives and purposes of bilateral relations, answers on a continuum 
between common values and common interests are to be expected. The 
purpose of jointly expanding liberal democracy over the globe would indicate 
a commitment to common values, whereas a mutual increase in economic 
exchange would point to rather pragmatic notions of common interests. Again, 
shifts in these constructions are perceived as reflecting a more general change 
in meaning attached to the relationship.
3 Case Comparison: Andreotti 1984 and Berlusconi 2003
Now having at hand an analytical framework which allows capturing patterns 
of interaction and intersubjective structures of meaning, two cases of bilateral 
incidents will be examined in order to learn about changes in the bilateral 
relationship.
3.1 Selected Cases and Methods
In both cases to be compared, incidents have been caused by taboo-breaking 
statements of high Italian representatives – Foreign Minister Andreotti in 
1984 and Prime Minister Berlusconi in 2003. I argue that these cases are 
comparable – at least within the limits historical comparison always faces – 
and of explicative value.
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3.1.1 The Andreotti Case 1984: “The Threat of Pangermanism”
On September 4th, 1984, then Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti was invited to 
a festival of the communist party’s organ Unità. Originally, the whole setting 
was predominantly marked by domestic political topics and dynamics. Andreotti 
delivered his address as some kind of an alien: The experiment of governing 
together with the communists had failed, and his own demo-Christian party 
found itself to be part of a government coalition with the socialist party under 
Prime Minister Craxi. The communists on their part were digesting not only 
the return to opposition but also the considerable loss of their leader Berlinguer 
only few months before. Elections to the European Parliament had ended 
in the first relative victory of the communist PCI over the demo-Christian 
DC, nourishing the historical competition between both parties (Hausmann 
2004). Against such a background, however, the event immediately awoke 
international interest when it became public that Andreotti had replied off the 
cuff to a statement on the “German question” in the following words:
“We all agree that both German states are on good terms with each other 
[…]. But it should be clear that one should not exaggerate in that direction, 
meaning that one must recognize: Pangermanism has to be overcome. Two 
German states exist, and two German states should remain”.
This statement, originally thought to comment on the sudden cancellation 
of Honecker’s visit in the Federal Republic, evoked a storm of protest in the 
German political establishment as well as in the media. A guessing game started, 
trying to solve the riddle of Andreotti’s motivation: had he been carried away 
by the atmosphere of a communist festival, where the majority saw German 
division as some kind of just punishment for the crimes committed in the past 
(Petersen 1999)?7 Was it simply about a manifestation of the general Italian 
alienness towards the German question (Scheib 2001)?8 Or did Andreotti 
instead pursue a vulpine strategy, aimed at assuring communist support for 
his potential presidential candidature?9 Be that as it may, it was for certain 
7  In this sense, the PCI was the only Italian party promoting offensively and explicitly the 
recognition of the German Democratic Republic (Scheib 2001: 186).
8  With the exception of German Ostpolitik that had been very popular in Italy, Italian attitude 
was limited to occasional statements of sympathy towards the Federal Republic (Scheib 2001). 
Therefore, Corni argues that Andreotti’s words “mirrored cynically what others had only thought” 
(Corni 2004: 51, my translation).
9  This thesis dominated discussion of the incident in Italian newspapers. Indeed, it perfectly fit 
into Andreotti’s image being described as “la volpe”, the fox, and it was hard to believe that he had 
not taken into account the consequences of what he said.
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that he caused strong, unanimous irritation in Germany. This was firstly due 
to the fact that Andreotti publicly put German reunification into question – at 
that time, still a taboo within the Western alliance. Yet Italy had always had 
an ambiguous position on a reunified Germany and inwardly many may have 
had doubts, so far at least on a rhetorical level all Italian politicians had been 
clearly supporting it10. Secondly, Germans were displeased by the adoption 
of the phrase “pangermanism”. Hitherto this had been typical for communist 
propaganda, denouncing the Federal Republic’s supposed revanchist stance in 
particular after Kohl’s coming into power. The forced cancellation of Honecker’s 
visit had been nothing but the most recent example (Sterpellone 1985; Hacke 
2003)11. Just in a moment when the Federal Republic was confronted with 
severe attacks by the Soviet Union, a close ally seemed to embrace the same 
arguments. This was perceived as an affront to Western Germany’s efforts of 
reconciliation. These reasons altogether let Andreotti’s statement grow into a 
well and truly bilateral quarrel between Italy and Germany. The conflict was 
terminated only by Andreotti’s public adjustment and excuses12. 
3.1.2 The Berlusconi Case 2003: “A Perfect Nazi Guard”
In the second half of 2003, Italy took over the presidency of the European 
Union’s Council. Expectations and demands towards the presidency were very 
high, on the one hand due to the difficult situation the EU had to confront 
after the Iraq crisis, and on the other hand due to diffidence and scepticism 
Berlusconi’s return to power had raised among the European partners. For 
them, Italy’s European policy had become less calculable; it seemed to be 
10  This is why then Italian ambassador in Germany, Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, criticizes Andreotti 
more in terms of style rather than in substance: “Many have already spoken it out, everyone thought 
it, but articulate it so brutally was not appropriate at all” (Ferraris 1994: 258, my translation).
11  It is indeed true that Kohl adopted a new tone in intra-German relations, emphasizing stronger 
than his predecessors the incompatibility between the two Germanys, and claiming the moral 
superiority of the Federal Republic. He also caused some perplexity when, only a few days before 
the Andreotti incident, he stated that German acceptance of the Eastern German border (Oder-
Neisse) would be valid only until a future German reunification (cf. La Repubblica 19.09.1984, p. 
11). Nevertheless, Hacke concludes that in substance, the new government’s German policy was 
marked by continuity (Hacke 2003: 302ff.).
12  Since in this paper I focus on the settlement of conflicts rather than on the conflicts itself, 
I limit myself to this brief case description. Details on the Andreotti case and its wider contests 
as well as on the Italian and German domestic situation may be found in Ferraris (1990, 1994, 
1996); Corni (2004); Hacke (2003); Romano (2004); Rusconi (1992); Scheib (2001); Sterpellone 
(1985).
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less inclined towards integration and rather Euro-sceptic. Indeed, Berlusconi 
had put new emphasis on objectives such as the defence of national interests, 
raising Italy’s international profile and the promotion of closer links with 
the USA (Quaglia 2007: 136)13. Scepticism was further nurtured by Foreign 
Minister Ruggiero’s dismissal in January 2006, the Italian withdrawal from 
the Airbus project, Berlusconi’s resistance to the European arrest warrant and 
his decision to side with the USA during the Iraq crisis (Braun 2004; Caciagli 
2004). Particularly in Germany, also the involvement of two right-wing parties 
in Berlusconi’s coalition had raised many criticisms. Chancellor Schröder even 
compared his Italian colleague to the right-wing populists Haider and Le Pen14. 
Besides scepticism amongst European governments, also the European media 
were harsh on Berlusconi’s coalition, especially in light of taking over the EU 
presidency. The German “Die Zeit” entitled Italian presidency as “European fall 
of mankind” (27/2003, my translation), and the British “Economist” certified 
Berlusconi to be “unfit to lead Europe” (386/2003). Against such a background, 
the Berlusconi government intended to use the office for brushing up its 
international reputation. But yet the first day turned to become a “diplomatic 
Waterloo” (Pistello/Fiore 2004: 27, my translation). In response to Berlusconi’s 
inaugural speech in the European parliament, outlining the program of Italy’s 
presidency, German social democratic deputy Martin Schulz made two points 
directly criticizing the Italian Prime Minister. Schulz firstly referred to racist 
comments made by minister Bossi and compared him to Haider, calling 
Berlusconi to take responsibility for his ministers; and secondly, he pointed 
at the Prime Minister’s conflict of interest when complaining about the slow 
progress made by Italy on a number of pan-European judicial measures. In his 
reply, Berlusconi let himself get carried away to the following statement:
“Mr Schulz, I know there is a producer in Italy who is making a film about 
Nazi concentration camps. I will suggest you for the role of guard. You would 
be perfect!”15
13  In the literature there is vivid debate on whether Berlusconi’s European policy changed only 
in style or also in substance. Some authors even speak of a “new policy paradigm” (Quaglia 2007). 
For details see Coralluzzo 2006; Quaglia 2007; Brighi 2006, and footnote 27.
14  Schröder did so on a party conference in May 2002. The statement found his way into the SPD 
publication “Blick nach rechts”, but had to be retracted under public pressure. Two years before 
Schröder already had caused a storm of protest when he asked for severe EU sanctions in case of 
right-wing parties coming into power in Italy (cf. Die Zeit 9/2000).
15  The full text of the debate is accessible under http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+CRE+20030702+ITEM-001+DOC+XML+V0//IT&language=IT.
From friends to collaborators? A comparison of bilateral conflicts in the Italo-German relationship
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 6/2009 | Page 13
Berlusconi caused not only a wave of protest in the EU parliament, but also 
in Germany, where his attack was perceived as unacceptable offence reviving 
old stereotypes of Nazi Germany16. The gaffe thus became a bilateral incident, 
keeping both countries’ politics and diplomacy busy for nearly two months. 
During the following weeks, it further escalated. Italian State Secretary on 
Tourism Stefani attacked German tourists in Italy as being “stereotypical 
blonds with hypernationalist pride […] who noisily invade our beaches” 
(Graff 2003) and, as a response, German chancellor Schröder cancelled his 
vacation in Italy. The dispute flared up again when Schröder, a month later, 
was invited by the President of the European Commission (and former Italian 
Prime Minister) Prodi to some kind of reconciliation summit at Verona. Against 
initial scheduling, Berlusconi refrained from participating – a comportment 
that became still interpreted against the background of the Schulz case, though 
such a reading was denied by Berlusconi himself. However, in Verona partners 
finally decided to leave the incident behind and closed it formally.17
3.1.3 Selection Criteria and Comparability
The two particular cases have been selected for a variety of reasons. Firstly I 
selected cases of conflict for the above cited motives. Secondly, I tried to hold 
the initial conflict constellations as similar as possible for allowing a focus on 
conflict management instead of conflict contents. Indeed, basic parameters for 
settlement are quite comparable: in both cases, Germany felt offended by a 
high Italian representative. In both cases, incidents were about central aspects 
of German identity casted into doubt – strive for reunification and dissociation 
from the Third Reich. And in both cases, the German government expected 
an excuse from the Italian partner. Thirdly, I chose cases located in similar 
institutional settings – here, the more restricted bilateral framework. Note 
that this refers to settlement processes rather than to initial incidents, which 
by contrast were situated in very different surroundings: Andreotti made a 
16  Kapò were concentration camp prisoners which found themselves privileged by the SS to 
command other prisoners. Though mostly being criminals instead of political prisoners or Jews, 
they were Nazi victims too (Levi 1979). However, in the following debate Berlusconi’s statement 
was widely interpreted as intending to say that Schulz’s behaviour was like a SS camp guard: “It 
is not clear, however, that either Berlusconi nor much of the European media were aware of what 
he was saying” (Downey/Koenig 2006: 170).
17  Again, I limit myself to such a brief case description leaving out many details, developments 
and contests. These are described – though quite subjective, but still very detailed – in Pistelli/
Fiore (2004). See also Missiroli 2004 and Downey/Koenig 2006.
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quite informal statement at a communist party festival, driven by dynamics 
of domestic politics and probably without having international or bilateral 
implications in mind. Berlusconi, on the other hand, spoke in the very formal 
situation of Italy’s EU presidency inauguration in the European parliament, 
yet by definition an international event. However, in both cases incidents were 
immediately perceived and treated as bilateral problems. In 1984, the dispute 
between the bilateral partners clearly outweighed its domestic aspects – in the 
media coverage as well as in the perception of the involved politicians and 
diplomats. Also in 2003 the case was framed predominantly in bilateral terms. 
Indeed, Downey/Koenig (2006) who surveyed European media coverage 
following the dispute, observed that the involved actors were portrayed as 
representatives of their nations rather than as members of parties or European 
institutions they belonged to. Furthermore, although conducted intensively 
across Europe, the debate was three times more intensive in the involved 
countries. What is essential is that in both cases, partners turned to “classical” 
bilateral modes of diplomacy in order to settle the conflict – with diverging 
emphases and success, as the analysis will reveal.
3.1.4 Data and Methods
The data for comparing the cases primarily consists of newspaper articles. 
I analysed coverage of four Italian and four German daily newspapers: 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau 
and Die Welt in the case of Germany; La Repubblica, Corriere della Sera, Il 
Sole/24 Ore and La Stampa in the case of Italy. Altogether, 562 articles have 
been collected and analyzed. After having gathered all articles related to the 
incident, I examined them by using qualitative content analysis (Mayring 1997, 
2000). In addition, the analysis was further enhanced through the inclusion 
of 14 expert interviews (Meuser/Nagel 1991) that I conducted with involved 
Italian and German diplomats and politicians18. Interviewing was done using, 
the problem-centred interview method has been applied (Witzel 2000). As I 
will show in the following, a comparison of both cases shows significant and 
instructive differences.
18  See a list of interview partners in the annex. At the requests of most diplomats, in this paper 
their statements became anonymized. This is not true for the case of Genscher and Andreotti. As 
being public figures, they are cited literally.
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3.2 Changes in Interaction: From Resolution to Cohabitation
A comparison of interaction patterns in the Andreotti and the Berlusconi cases 
demonstrates that behaviour of both partners has indeed changed over time. 
In dealing with these conflicts, on our analytical continuum partners have slid 
significant steps from solution towards escalation.
3.2.1 Government Contacts
In the Andreotti case, government contacts took place quite frequently. Five 
direct contacts at highest level became known in a conflict period of only one 
week. Two times Italian Ambassador Ferraris was summoned to the Foreign 
Ministry. Italian Prime Minister Craxi and German chancellor Kohl exchanged 
letters of excuse and reconciliation. To terminate the conflict finally, German 
Foreign Minister Genscher held a closed meeting with his Italian colleague 
Andreotti at Brussels. Beyond the sheer fact of meeting, both governments 
seemed to be willing to reconcile. In fact, the two talks between Ferraris and 
the German representatives were first and foremost characterized by the will to 
express German disappointment and bitterness and especially Genscher used 
drastic words to do so. During an interview with the authoress he emphasized 
having been obliged to summon ambassador Ferraris in order to calm down 
public discussion in Germany – without however attributing much importance 
to the case himself.19 Yet, German representatives also communicated 
their interest in knowing more about the circumstances of Andreotti’s 
statement and about the Italian position in general. Especially the practice, 
unknown in Germany, of a government member delivering an address at an 
opposition party’s manifestation attracted some curiosity, if it was not taken 
as explanation for Andreotti’s words. The Italian side went one step further 
towards solution, not only explaining the severe German reactions. In his letter 
to Kohl Craxi essentially qualified the statements made. Without mentioning 
Andreotti explicitly, he assured Kohl of Italy’s unchanged support for German 
reunification. In Genscher’s meeting with Andreotti himself, finally, both 
governments agreed on a common declaration which had been prepared in 
advance by the embassies. Diplomats that were involved also reported a high 
interest in conflict solution. In Brussels, for example, Italian and German 
19  Genscher: “Here in Germany they expected who knows what kind of severe reaction from 
me” (in the following, all translations from the interviews are mine). During an interview with the 
authoress in Bonn, April 2009.
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representatives “got together in order to discuss: ‘how can we proceed?’. This 
was our objective. […] It was our job to avoid that the EEC barge would hit 
choppy waters every time in Rome or wherever one of them turned to be a 
loose cannon”. Government contacts in the Andreotti case, thus, undoubtedly 
aimed to solve the incident.
In contrast, the situation is somewhat more complicated in the Berlusconi 
case. Firstly, direct government contacts were less frequent. In spite of 
the longer duration of the conflict (altogether 53 days), only 5 meetings of 
government representatives became known. Directly following the incident, 
both Foreign Ministries summoned the respective ambassadors, Neubert and 
Fagiolo. Though not situated at the highest level in administration hierarchy 
(ambassadors talked with the respective Political Directors), the sessions were 
exclusively used to communicate the respective irritation, but not to understand 
partner positions or even to reconcile. For instance, German ambassador 
Neubert reports how he was summoned nearly informally to the Italian Foreign 
Ministry and had a “friendly talk” with his Italian colleague – whereas, as 
he came to know afterwards, the Farnesina’s political direction had already 
released a Communiqué announcing the ambassador’s chastisement prior to 
his actual arrival. The agreement on a common declaration was thus doomed 
to failure. Involved diplomats remember how the embassies were engaged in 
working on a common wording the entire next day, an enterprise that did not 
succeed due to “eagerness and insistence” of politicians on either side. The 
lowest common denominator that could be agreed upon was a telephone talk 
between German chancellor Schröder and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi 
which finally took place in the evening of that same day. However, rather than 
resolving the incident, both sides again changed their irreconcilable points of 
view without any convergence of positions. Consequentially, the interpretation 
of the talk could not be other than equivocal: whereas Schröder announced to 
accept Berlusconi’s apologies in order to end the quarrelling “to the benefit 
of Europe”, Berlusconi publicly denied having made any excuse at all. In the 
following days, both governments preferred communicating via media. Only 
when Stefani‘s article had become public, did Italian Foreign Minister Frattini 
and his German colleague Fischer meet in Brussels. Frattini dissociated 
himself and the whole Italian government from Stefani’s statements, thereby 
attempting to appease his counterpart and adopting a somewhat more integrative 
behaviour. Finally, the meeting of Schröder and Berlusconi at Verona which 
was thought to become some kind of “summit of reconciliation” was firstly 
overshadowed by Berlusconi’s non-attendance at the scheduled opera visit and 
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secondly characterized by the attempt to ignore the conflict, without coming 
to a shared interpretation. Government contacts in the second case of study, 
therefore, aimed not as plainly as in the first case to resolve the incident. In 
effect, both partners showed less interest in contacts in general and within 
the few contacts, less integrative behaviour. An exception has to be made for 
Frattini who tried to settle the conflict during a meeting with Fischer. 
3.2.2 Position-Taking
In the Andreotti case, communication was driven by the Italian will to downplay 
the Foreign Minister’s statement. Many actors engaged in this undertaking: 
firstly Italian Ambassador Ferraris, who made efforts to minimize the case 
adopting a double-sided strategy. On the one hand, he tried to convince Andreotti 
that he had failed and asked for his excuses, explaining the German point of 
view. On the other hand, vis-à-vis his German counterparts, he downplayed 
the controversy by attributing it merely to translation misunderstandings20. 
Secondly the Italian Foreign Ministry itself engaged in narrowing down. The 
same day a qualification of Andreotti’s utterance became published, saying 
that it had been made in an informal context without any memorandum in 
writing. Thirdly, nearly all Italian politicians including Prime Minister Craxi 
unanimously rejected potential doubts about Italian support for German 
reunification. And finally, also Andreotti himself substantially retracted his 
statement when relating the accusation of pangermanism not any longer to the 
Federal Republic, but instead to a demonstration of right-wingers in South-
Tyrol that had taken place some days before his gaffe. The German counterparts, 
on the other hand, demonstrated readiness to accept these qualifications and 
excuses. Genscher, after his meeting with Ferraris, announced to be highly 
pleased, and after having met Andreotti he called for closing the incident 
and looking ahead. Even Kohl, who remained somewhat unsatisfied after 
Craxi’s letter, accepted Andreotti’s declaration at Brussels. Whereas Andreotti 
thereby accepted the German request for an excuse, this is not the case for 
Berlusconi. In the telephone talk with Schröder he indeed expressed his 
regrets, but explicitly stated: “I did not apologize”21. After the publication of 
20  Indeed, the Italian word “devono” referring to the enduring existence of two German states 
has been translated into the German word “sollen” (should), although it can also mean “müssen” 
(must). In this sense, Ferraris argued that Andreotti had pointed merely to the improbability of 
German reunification rather than to its non-desiderability.
21  Cf. for instance La Repubblica, 05.07.2003, p. 6 (in the following, all translations from Italian 
and German newspaper articles are mine).
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Stefani’s article, Berlusconi first refused to ask for Stefani’s resignation, as 
demanded by the German partner. It was more the pressure of several Italian 
tourist associations than the will to appease the German partner that made 
Berlusconi give in finally. On the German side, respectively, Schröder first 
seemed to accept the vague excuses “for the benefit of Europe”. After Stefani’s 
article, Schröder himself contributed to further escalation. Whereas Fischer 
seemed to be disposed to accept the relativizing statements by Italian ministers, 
Schröder insisted on asking for Stefani’s withdrawal and even threatened 
with the cancellation of his vacation in Italy. In general, a lower willingness 
to concessions and thus, a lower engagement for settlement is observable 
on both sides. Also the attempts to downplay the incident vary significantly 
from the Berlusconi to the Andreotti case. First insights can already be drawn 
from looking at the different labelling of the incidents in the newspapers. The 
event in 1984 is predominantly called simply bilateral or diplomatic incident; 
however, very often also trivializing definitions such as “polemic”, “dropping 
a brick” or “argument” can be found. Dramatizing definitions like “bilateral 
earthquake”, “severe storm” only rarely appear. Directly opposed to that, the 
prevalent labelling of the Berlusconi incident is rather scandalizing, speaking 
of the “bottom of Italo-German relations since 1945”, “clash” or even “war”. 
Maybe due to the longer duration, also the language in the newspapers becomes 
more drastic. Besides commentatorship, however, the situation becomes more 
ambivalent in both cases, which is maybe due to the respective domestic 
situations in both countries. On the one hand, labels used by some political 
actors in 1984 were quite severe. Genscher and Kohl repeatedly alluded to a 
“serious hurt”. As the Frankfurter Rundschau observed properly, they nearly 
suggested “the imminent breakdown of diplomatic relations to Rome”22. The 
social democratic opposition was more disposed to downplay the incident, 
thereby also criticising the government’s strong wordings. This situation 
was mirrored on the Italian side, where the government tried to trivialise the 
dispute, whereas opposition used harsh definitions in order to thereby attack 
the Foreign Minister. A similar situation can be found in the 2003 case, where 
again Italian government and German opposition try to downplay the incident, 
whereas German government and Italian opposition tended to exaggerate the 
conflict, in order to attack or, respectively, defend themselves from domestic 
counterparts. Labelling the conflict thus does not change significantly over 
time, but is in both countries and cases strongly marked by the internal political 
debate. What varies, however, is the range attributed to the dispute. In 1984, 
22  Frankfurter Rundschau, 18.09.1984, p. 3.
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statements of all actors are marked by the intention to reduce Andreotti’s 
statement to his personal opinion, which does not coincide with Italian 
government as a whole. This is not true in the 2003 case, when Berlusconi 
for instance stated that Schulz’s attack offended not only him “personally, but 
Italy as a whole”23. In turn, German government spokesman Anda declared that 
Stefani’s article marked a “general despising of all Germans”24; a view shared 
by the Italian opposition. This is even more striking as in the former case, the 
conflict object (casting doubt on German reunification) in fact concerned all 
Germans, whereas in the latter case one single German had been attacked. 
However, a lesser interest in minimizing the conflict is evident in government 
interaction. Though involved diplomats tried to calm the conflict, they where 
stopped by their respective political authorities. This is indeed very instructive: 
in 1984, we observe many efforts to limit the range of the incident on all sides, 
which indicates a more integrative and relation-protecting approach. In 2003, 
by contrast, politicians even exaggerated the importance of the incident and 
disregarded the fact that this would hinder conflict settlement.
3.2.3 Publicity
Different degrees of interest in downplaying the case are also reflected in the 
degree of publicity which varies strikingly between 1984 and 2003. Doubtless 
this is due to changes in the media, different data collection methods25 as well 
as divergent conflict duration26. But the gap between 106 articles in 1984 and 
456 (!) articles in 2003 appears too huge to be explained only by external 
developments. Indeed, it is also related to both governments’ cacophony, a 
higher scandalization of the incident and a lack of efforts to resolve the case 
23  Corriere della Sera, 05.07.2003, p. 1.
24  Corriere della Sera, 08.07.2003, p. 6.
25  In the former case, newspaper coverage has been scanned by me in person in order to identify 
articles dealing with the incident. In the latter case, this work has been done by a computer program 
which undoubtedly worked more accurately. It is hence probable that in the recent case articles 
have been included in the analysis which in the former case would have been overlooked.
26  If calculated day-by-day, in the Andreotti case there are eight days with newspaper coverage, 
an average of 12.35 articles per day. In the Berlusconi case, there are 22 days with newspaper 
coverage (from a total of 53 days which is the entire conflict period), what makes still an average 
of 22.8 articles per day. Besides such number games, I would doubt that conflict durance has 
a one-sided influence on media coverage, that is to say, media coverage is purely a result of 
conflict durance. Instead, I assume that in turn also media coverage can influence conflict durance. 
Therefore, it is treated as an autonomous observation here.
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behind closed doors. In 1984, for instance, ambassador Ferraris refused to 
publicly comment on his talks with Genscher, and remembers that also the 
German Foreign Minister for his part did not inform the press: “As a courtesy 
and in order to appease the whole situation, Genscher avoided journalists or 
television being present” (Ferraris 1990: 108). Similarly, Italian Prime Minister 
Craxi kept silent for four days until he wrote a letter of excuse to German 
chancellor Kohl. Kohl, in turn, did not even mention the incident in an election 
campaign speech dedicated to Ostpolitik and the German question. Contrarily, 
in 2003 the Berlusconi incident seemed to be an event which everyone should 
comment on in public. Schröder, for instance, chose a government declaration 
in parliament, and thus a moment of maximum media attention, to declare that 
he was waiting for Berlusconi’s formal excuses. Furthermore, both heads of 
governments did not cut off the unprecedented cacophony of their government 
members which hindered a smooth pacification.
3.2.4 Ending the Conflict
Regarding the ending of the conflict, the Andreotti incident can be interpreted 
as a case of conflict resolution. After a closed meeting with German Foreign 
Minister Genscher one week after the incident, Andreotti declared that he 
regretted his statement, that his accusation of pangermanism was not addressed 
to the Federal Republic but rather related to a demonstration of right-wing 
South Tyrols at Innsbruck, and, most importantly, that German reunification still 
enjoyed unrestricted Italian support. He therewith fully accepted the German 
reading of the incident and granted their request for a formal excuse. Or simply, 
in Genscher’s words: “In Brussels, Andreotti accepted the draft I had prepared 
before. And the subject was closed”.27 By doing so, an adjustment of policies 
to the preferences of the partner (Pfeiffer 2006) – and thus, a solution – took 
place. In contrast, in the Berlusconi case conflict solution did not succeed. The 
Italian and German governments, despite of some more or less serious attempts 
at reconciliation, only arrived at a continuation of cooperation while tacitly 
accepting the continuing existence of divergences – what could be labelled 
cohabitation (Pfeiffer 2006). It was not possible to find a common position 
on conflict interpretation. The German government insisted on having been 
offended one-sidedly and unjustly, whereas the Italian government stuck to the 
version of a German provocation and thus, to reciprocal responsibility. This 
27  During an interview with the authoress in Bonn, April 2009.
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became clear for example in the attempt to work out a common declaration, 
which in the end failed because of Italian reluctance to include formal excuses 
and German unwillingness to refer also to Schulz’s “provocation”. Neither 
side was disposed to give in, and accept the other side’s request for excuses, as 
it had been true in the Andreotti case. Due to the incompatibility of positions 
and the unwillingness to make them converge, the incident was not closed 
unanimously, but both governments chose their own respective interpretations 
and only avoided addressing them further.
3.2.5 Duration
As already mentioned, conflict duration varied significantly between both 
conflicts: from a one-week-period in 1984 to an almost two-month-period (53 
days) in 2003. The difference in lengths is not the case or due do “objective”, 
external circumstances. Quite the contrary, the differences in conflict duration 
can be understood as a result of the different behaviours adopted. In this sense, 
it is remarkable to what extent all actors in 1984 actively contributed to a fast 
closing of the incident, not only by adopting damage-limiting behaviour, but 
also by refraining from additional statements once the incident was closed. 
This is true even in a situation in which a reference to the incident was to 
be expected: as already mentioned, Kohl did not even name the incident in a 
speech explicitly about German Ostpolitik only a few days after Genscher’s 
and Andreotti’s meeting at Bruxelles. Furthermore, in the mass of articles 
on German-French reconciliation on the occasion of Mitterand’s and Kohl’s 
meeting at Verdun, only very few voices referred to recent Italo-German 
quarrels. In the Berlusconi case, in turn, quite the opposite was true: for about 
two months, the conflict further escalated due to never-ending debates and 
reciprocal accusations – for instance the attacks by State Secretary on Tourism 
Stefani, the decision of German chancellor Schröder to cancel his vacation in 
Italy, and the non-attendance of Berlusconi at the opera visit. Indeed, involved 
diplomats did not find the initial, somewhat populist behaviour of the leaders 
Schröder and Berlusconi surprising, which they call “a typical Berlusconi” 
and a “classical Schröder”28. But the fact that Stefani added fuel to the fire, 
and virtually every Italian and German politician was keen to contribute to the 
debate, and neither Berlusconi nor Schröder attempted to end media cacophony 
– all this added a new quality to the settlement process in their view.
28  During interviews with the authoress.
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The comparison of interaction patterns in terms of resolution versus escalation 
points to significant changes over time. Termination of the conflict shifts from 
resolution to cohabitation, the behaviour of both partners from damage-limiting 
towards confrontational, conflict settlement from smooth and fast to slow-
moving. As stated in the beginning, these developments are taken to represent 
a general drift on the interaction layer as such. However, at this point results 
are quite superficial. They may suggest that changes are due to – for instance – 
particular domestic constellations, and sympathy or antipathy between acting 
politicians. Above all, changes could be traced back to differences in political 
culture, characters and styles of the respective leaders. This argument has 
become very prominent especially when talking about Berlusconi’s foreign 
policy (Brighi 2006; Croci 2001; Fedel 2003; Campus 2002)29. And it seems 
plausible – too striking are the differences in style between politicians such 
as Schröder and Berlusconi on the one hand and Andreotti and Genscher on 
the other hand. Even if the analysis of interaction already has shown that it 
was not all about the behaviour of leaders, but at least the whole political elite 
that changed their interactions, one may still attribute that to the particular 
characters of two alpha dogs. In order to clarify whether the observed changes 
are basically limited to individual characteristics and personal constellations 
or not (that is, whether changes are predominantly linked to Berlusconi and 
Schröder or not), taking a look at deeper rooted intersubjective structures is 
instructive. These are expected to change more slowly and thus, are not directly 
dependent on single persons in power. If change can be found also within this 
dimension, a more substantial character of that very change becomes evident.
3.3 Changes in Meaning: From Value-Based to Pragmatic   
 Constructions
During both conflicts’ settlement processes, all actors describe the relationship 
in overwhelmingly positive terms. Italo-German relations are labelled 
“excellent” and could not work better30. However, a closer look reveals that 
29  As Brighi puts it aptly: “From May 2001, […] Italy’s political life has been more or less 
equated with the deeds, and often misdeeds, of its prime minister” (Brighi 2006). Regarding 
foreign policy, there is a debate whether Berlusconi has changed Italian foreign policy (a thesis 
supported among others by Ignazi (2004) and Rossi (2002)) or whether it basically remained 
stable in substance, though rhetoric may have changed (this claim represented most prominently 
by Croci (2001, 2002)).
30  Cf. for instance Corriere della Sera 04.08.2003, p. 9; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
17.09.1984, p. 3.
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partners attach diverging meanings to their bilateral relationship. A comparison 
of these patterns of meaning suggests a shift from more idealistic towards 
utilitarian constructions.
3.3.1 The Relationship’s Importance
At first sight, constructions of the relationship’s importance remain quite 
constant over time. Publicly both sides continuously emphasize its value. 
However, differences in degree can be observed. Firstly, in 1984, statements 
on importance are rare. The relationship’s significance does not need to be 
explained in detail but is considered obvious: talking about rationales seems 
not to be necessary at all. In contrast, importance is no longer taken as a given in 
the 2003 case, but has to be explained. When doing so, secondly, the approach 
is much more pragmatic, in the sense that statements of importance are framed 
in cost-benefit terms. Statements about purposes alter their frames of references 
from normative to pragmatic goals; they are much more concrete, explicit and 
short-termed in the latter case. In 1984, the few existing assertions are quite 
broad and abstract – for instance, when Craxi states that “a good relationship 
between Rome and Berlin is essential for defending the entire occident”31. 
Instead of naming concrete objectives, the relationship is implicitly (or rarely, 
explicitly) linked to broader normative goals. Furthermore, the relationship is 
perceived as an end in itself, a “friendship in which both are interested”32 − 
independent from concrete utility calculations. This is very different in 2003, 
when talking about purposes of cooperation seems to occupy a great deal of all 
bilateral considerations. Overwhelmingly, in this case, statements are related 
to Italy’s EU presidency. The German delegate for European Integration in the 
Foreign Ministry, Bury, emphasises that “we are interested in a constructive 
collaboration”33 in order to close convention works successfully. In the 
same sense, Schröder repeats time and again that “the federal government 
has an interest in the success of the Italian EU presidency”34. In turn, Italian 
ambassador Fagioli is convinced that in the end, “the common interest of Italy 
and Germany in Europe will prevail”35. Such common interest is located first 
31  Corriere della Sera 18.09.1984, p. 2.
32  Corriere della Sera 17.09.1984, p. 1.
33  La Stampa, 04.07.2003, p. 2.
34  La Stampa, 04.07.2003, p. 3; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 11.07.2008, p.1; Corriere della 
Sera, 04.07.2003, p. 2.
35  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11.07.2008, p. 1.
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and foremost in institutional reforms. Beyond that, other concrete fields of 
Italo-German cooperation in Europe are mentioned. German Minister of the 
Interior Schily, for instance, praised Italo-German collaboration in EU-border 
politics. Leaving the European contexts, few hints are made to Italo-German 
cooperation in the global context, for example in the settlement of conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore economic interdependences and cooperation 
are brought up. While stating these rationales, very strong pragmatic notions 
become evident, most present in German statements, which often speak about 
“sober working relations”36. And thirdly, besides individuation of concrete 
cooperation fields, the analysis indicates that Italo-German relations have lost 
centrality within the partners’ foreign policies: at least, explicit statements on 
centrality can be found almost only during the Andreotti incident.
3.3.2 Foundations
Debates during the incidents also contain statements about the fundaments 
of the relationship. In both cases, the overwhelmingly dominant normative 
underpinning is that of “alliance”. That is to say, partners position their 
togetherness above all in the context of the Western alliance or the European 
Union. Differences in the importance of the two contexts are not substantial, 
but can be attributed to the historical context as well as to the conflict object: 
whereas in 1984, when the incident was about the German question and 
thus, about the East-West Conflict, references to the Western alliance were 
more frequent, in 2003 the conflict took place against the background of the 
Italian EU-presidency, which made the EU-context predominate. Despite 
such continuity in frameworks, however, its substantial meaning, the concepts 
to which it is related and the context in which it becomes mentioned seem 
to be quite different. In the Andreotti case, the construction of the German-
Italian alliance was strongly value-based. Actors referred to solidarity, 
liberty and peace when speaking about it. Italian Prime Minister Craxi, for 
instance, declared that German-Italian cooperation is built upon liberty and the 
Western creed37 and a Demo-Christian politician stated that the Italo-German 
relationship contributes to peace and liberty in Europe38. Also the German 
government emphasised German-Italian initiatives for peace and liberty in the 
36  Original wording: „sachliche Arbeitsbeziehungen“. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25. 
August 2008, p. 5.
37  Cf. Il Sole/24 Ore, 18.09.1984.
38  Cf. Il Corriere della Sera, 14.09.1984.
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Western World. On such a strong foundation, the conflict is not perceived as to 
be threatening the relationship as such, as Andreotti himself stated explicitly: 
“In certain moments, it was possible that we had a somewhat different opinion 
in some aspects. But this took place against the background of commonality; 
we always have been much more convergent than divergent”39. Quite 
different from that, in 2003 the category became a more pragmatic notion, 
and commonality is not as central as before. For example, an Italian diplomat 
compares the Berlusconi case to former conflicts and observes: “The Berlusconi 
case could escalate in such a manner because basic braces which hold together 
the relationship are no longer as strong as before: personal relations, values, 
culture, party relations. […]. In such a new environment, crises take longer”. 
Though references to common values were continuously made, especially by 
State Presidents Rau and Ciampi, the concept of ally was stronger related to 
single, limited projects of cooperation within different policy fields (as already 
the analysis of purposes has demonstrated). This is true again when talking 
about traditions. It is striking how in 1984, once more primarily commonalities 
are evoked. So both countries’ initial division and similar unification processes 
are frequently mentioned, in order to induce comprehension for Germany’s 
striving for reunification. But also other common traditions are remembered, 
e.g. Italo-German engagement in European integration after the Second World 
War. By drawing on common traditions, the actors try to bridge the current 
dispute and to emphasize the similarities and points of contact between both 
partners. This is the case only to a lesser degree in 2003. Still, “common 
traditions” are evoked to describe normative underpinnings of the relationship 
– but what these traditions are, is not specified in detail anymore. The only 
exception from generally more vague recourses to traditions is the Nazi/fascist 
period, which – also due to the conflict object – is tackled more in detail. In 
contrast to 1984, however, this is not to provoke sense of community, but used 
as a means to attack the partner in the political debate.
3.3.3 Partner Orientation
Differences in partner orientation become evident when comparing the diverse 
degrees of empathy for the partner’s position. It is striking to what extent the 
Italian side in 1984 is keen to understand German frictions – ranging from 
huge mass of newspaper articles on the “German question” to politician’s 
39  During an interview with the authoress in Rome, March 2009.
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talks about a particular German sensibility. Genscher even announces his 
pleasure having encountered so much understanding in Italy. He was also 
convinced – and behaved in such way – that it was necessary to offer Andreotti 
a back door which allowed him to save his face: thereby demonstrating 
empathy with his partner.40 Apart from Genscher, German commentators also 
cautiously demonstrated comprehension for Andreotti when alluding to Kohl’s 
responsibility, who had at least irritated Western partners with statements on 
Germany’s future frontiers. In 2003, in contrast, these attempts lack on both 
sides – neither Italian newspapers publish comparable amounts of background 
explanations to the German past in general and the significance of the “kapos” 
in particular41, nor can we find much information about the background of 
Schulz’s provocation in German newspapers. Accordingly, statements by 
politicians are to a higher degree characterized by undifferentiated positions 
than in 1984. Beyond empathy both partners in 2003 seem to behave stronger 
unilateralist. Schröder as well as Berlusconi fished for one-sided advantage 
on the domestic stage, even at cost of the relationship. This is in fact an 
accusation which also Andreotti had to face. Many commentators interpreted 
his statement as a tactical move to gain communist support for his run for 
presidential office42. However, in dealing with the once triggered conflict, in 
1984 neither German nor Italian actors seemed to have sought for one-sided, 
domestic advantage. In 2003, instead, the Chancellor “with his intuition for 
people’s mood and tabloids’ headings reacted in all severity”43. Following the 
same logic, also the respective oppositional parties misused the case as ploy for 
internal political dispute, in Italy even more than in Germany. The Italian Left 
accused Berlusconi of damaging Italy’s image in Europe, whereas German 
conservatives criticised the populism of Schröder’s foreign policy. So one can 
say that in 1984 bilateral reconciliation was regarded a priority, whereas in 
2003 unilateralist thinking prevailed.
40  During an interview with the authoress in Rome, April 2009.
41  Of course some exceptions have to be made. Rusconi for example asks for “Never call a 
German ‘Kapo’” because this would mark a “serious moral and historical insensibility” (La 
Stampa, 03.07.2003, p. 2).
42  As La Repubblica puts it: “To assure communists’ applause, Andreotti ends up in re-echoing 
Pravda’s articles”, 16.09.1984, p. 3.
43  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11.07.2003, p.3.
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3.3.4 Partner Images
Changes are even more evident when comparing respective partner descriptions. 
In 1984, the terms “ally” and “friend” were used nearly equally often and 
sometimes even synonymously. Indeed, many politicians spoke of “our 
German” respectively “our Italian friends” – end even about “the people’s 
friendship”. Accordingly, acting politicians emphasize personal relations of 
friendship. Genscher calls Andreotti “my friend Giulio”, Andreotti characterizes 
his relationship with Genscher as “very cordial and intensive” (Franco 2002: 15) 
and expands this to the whole bilateral relationship: “There have always been 
good personal relations, it was not a relationship between enemies but between 
friends”44. In fact, much of German irritation seemed to be provoked by the 
fact that the accusation of pangermanism came from “a friend”: Genscher told 
the Italian ambassador feeling also personally betrayed, and Kohl’s spokesman 
announced that “the chancellor feels the same as all people do: anger about 
friends runs deeper”45. Involved German diplomats stated repeatedly that they 
felt as having been betrayed by a friend, and Italian diplomats confirmed that 
their German colleagues treated them accordingly. Friendship is thus conceived 
of as basic meaning of all bilateral contacts between both countries. It is also 
an a-political category, pointing to traditions, cultural, historical and personal 
connections. In 2003, in contrast, the term “friendship among the peoples” – 
even if still commonly used – has lost some of its substance. Yet rhetorically 
evoked, it is not anymore reflected in actual relations between politicians, for 
instance. This becomes most evident when Schröder, interviewed by an Italian 
newspaper, described his relationship with Berlusconi: “It is not necessary 
to love each other; it is enough to respect each other. […] Often you expect 
friendship between politicians, but one does not have to exaggerate towards 
this direction”46. Though used unanimously in official declarations, we can 
even speak about a marginalization of friendship as central category47. Instead 
the perception of the respective partner becomes stronger utilitarian. In 2003, 
the focus lied on Germany’s political and economical strength which was 
brought up in nearly every second (Italian) article. In contrast, the image of 
Germany emerging in the 1984 articles was characterized by descriptions of the 
44  During an interview with the authoress in Rome, March 2009.
45  Süddeutsche Zeitung 18.09.1984, p. 1.
46  La Repubblica, 18.08.2003.
47  Exception has to be made for the friendship between Rau and Ciampi; but in 2003, both found 
themselves against their wishes on the margins of the event and did not succeed in settling the 
incident.
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democratic character, the reliability and reservation of the Federal Republic; 
its economic strength was mentioned only two times in all articles. However, 
the category of friendship still had some practical relevance also in 2003, when 
it became a means in the internal political dispute. The German conservative 
opposition used the reference to German-Italian friendship in order to discredit 
the supposed short-sighted daily politics of the social-democratic chancellor, 
whereas in Italy in turn the oppositional parties from the Left alluded to the 
concept of friendship in order to criticise Berlusconi’s crisis management.
Concerning partner images, also adjustments regarding the perception 
of relative strength have been noted. Roles have become more asymmetric 
and contested. In 1984, an idea of a friendship at eye level prevailed: “If it is 
true that the Federal Republic is one of Italy’s most important political and 
economic partners, the same is true vice versa”48. Although objectively also 
in 1984 a real balance between them was mere illusion, German politicians 
emphasised German dependence on Western and particularly Italian support 
in the Cold War, therewith avoiding any impression of preponderance. In the 
expert interviews conducted, nearly all involved diplomats emphasized that 
the Andreotti case was a matter of conflict between equals. Also Genscher 
himself stated that he perceived Italy as a partner at eye level – “absolutely”.49 
In 2003, Italian politicians seem to be less optimistic regarding the symmetry 
in Italo-German relations. In many articles a fear of Franco-German 
prevalence in Europe shows through. It becomes very clear that Italy feels 
to be inequitably neglected and treated as “little brother”, much to Italian 
diplomats’ regrets: “For Germany, Italy has lost importance. Now there is 
inequality, a new inequality in our relationship”50. Yet, it still claims to be on 
eye level with Germany: that is why Italy’s role experiences do not match its 
role expectations anymore. On the German side, in turn, the problem seems to 
be less present. In the public statements, there are in fact no comments at all 
on a new asymmetry in the relationship – this implies, that there are neither 
attempts to assure symmetry, at least in terms of lip service. By the same token, 
within the interviews German diplomats seemed to be almost astonished when 
asked about Italo-German equality. For the German side, we can thus attest 
the loss of sensibility regarding Italian on-equal-term –wants and –needs. 
48  Corriere della Sera 17.09.1984, p. 1.
49  During an interview with the authoress in Bonn, April 2009.
50  During an interview with an Italian diplomat.
From friends to collaborators? A comparison of bilateral conflicts in the Italo-German relationship
PIFO Occasional Papers No. 6/2009 | Page 29
This absence indicates a new gap in Italian and German perceptions of their 
relationship’s composition: while the Italians stick to a symmetric setup, for 
Germans this is no longer the case.
In sum, changes in meaning are about changes in degrees. Still the 
relationship is regarded as important for the partners, still significant frames 
of reference are the European/Western alliance, and still they even speak about 
“Italo-German friendship”. However, a closer look reveals that within these 
constructions, changes have indeed occurred. It becomes most obvious in the 
dimension of relationship setup, where roles nowadays are more contested. 
But also regarding importance, foundations, and partner orientation, a shift 
from value-based to rather utilitarian constructions has taken place.
4 Conclusion
The analysis demonstrated the necessity to broaden our understanding of 
bilateral relations by including constructivist perspectives. In the Andreotti 
and the Berlusconi case, changes on the interaction level – in the sense of 
shifts from solution to escalation – are quite evident when comparing the two 
empirical cases. But they do not tell much about the depth of that very change. 
Going one step further, however, also in the dimension of meaning changes 
in degree can be found: constructions of the relationship shift from idealistic 
to rather pragmatic notions. From undisputed alliance loyalty, the “why’s” 
and “how’s” of Italo-German cooperation have become more contested and 
ambivalent. These results point to an enduring and substantial character of 
change that has taken place, since structures of meaning are intersubjective 
and hardly reducible to personality or particular circumstances. The analysis, 
thus, challenges prevailing beliefs on continuity in Italo-German relations and 
provides further empirical evidence in support of Rusconi’s estrangement-
hypothesis. Furthermore, it refutes simplistic explanations of Italo-German 
difficulties as caused exclusively by an Italian Prime Minister being unpopular 
in Germany. In contrast, merely superficial developments are accompanied by 
and embedded in deeper changes in the relationship’s meaning.
Although the results of the presented case comparison convey a clear 
message, they have to be treated somewhat cautiously. In the end, the analysis 
was about comparing two single anecdotes, which do not (and neither aim to) 
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represent the total sum of Italo-German contacts. They may still serve as first 
illustration of the usefulness of systematic comparative analysis. However, 
further research has to be undertaken in order to prove whether results hold 
true in other settings and broader frameworks of Italo-German cooperation.
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Annex: List of Interview Partners
Andreotti, Giulio, interviewed on March 4th, 2009 in Rome
 Italian politician, lifetime Senator. In 1984, Italian Foreign Minister
Auer, Stefan, interviewed on January 15th, 2009 in Berlin
 German diplomat. In 2003, Deputy Head of the EU Coordination Group,  
 German Foreign Ministry
Bottai, Bruno, interviewed on October 23th, 2008 in Rome
 Italian diplomat (rtd.). In 1984, Head of the Directorate-General Political  
 Affairs, Italian Foreign Ministry
Buccino Grimaldi, Giuseppe interviewed on March 4th, 2009 in Rome
 Italian diplomat. In 2003, Head of Division VI (Legal and Institutional  
 Affairs) in the Directorate-General European Integration, Italian Foreign
  Ministry (involved in the Intergovernmental Conference on the EU  
  Constitutional Treaty)
Calamia, Pietro, interviewed on October, 21st, 2008 in Rome
 Italian diplomat (rtd.). In 1984, Permanent Representative of Italy to the  
 EEC, Brussels
Cerboni, Guido, interviewed on March 5th, 2009 in Rome
 Italian diplomat. Currently Head of Division I (countries of central-
 northern Europe, including Germany) in the Directorate-General 
 Countries of Europe, Italian Foreign Ministry
Fagiolo, Silvio, interviewed on October 7th, 2009 in Rome
 Italian diplomat (rtd.). In 1984, First Counsellor (Political Affairs), 
 Italian Embassy in Bonn; in 2003, Italian Ambassador in Berlin
Ferraris, Luigi V., interviewed on June 7th, 2005 in Rome and on March 12th, 
2009 in Hildesheim
 Italian diplomat (rtd.). In 1984, Italian Ambassador in Bonn
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, interviewed on April, 6th in Bonn
 German politician (rtd.). In 1984, German Foreign Minister
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Mariani, Pio, interviewed on January 26th, 2009 via telephone
 Italian diplomat. In 2003, Head of Division I (countries of central-
 northern Europe, including Germany) in the Directorate-General 
 Countries of Europe, Italian Foreign Ministry
Neubert, Klaus, interviewed on December 5th, 2008 in Berlin
 German diplomat (rtd.). In 2003, German Ambassador in Rome
Poensgen, Gisbert, interviewed on November 28th, 2008 in Berlin
 German diplomat (rtd.). In 1984, Permanent Representative of Germany 
 to the EEC, Brussels
Schlaga, Christian, interviewed on January 20th, 2009 via telephone
 German diplomat. In 2003, First Counsellor (Political Affairs), German  
 Embassy in Rome
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